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DOES THE PRODUCER HA VE AN INCENTIVE 
TO SELL FED CATTLE ON A GRID? 
By 
S.W. Fausti and B. Qasmi 1 
ABSTRACT 
Barriers to the adoption of grid pricing by fed cattle producers are investigated over a 206-week 
period (Jan. 1997 to Dec. 2000). The empirical findings document: I) when fed cattle are evaluated on 
a grid pricing system versus a dressed weight pricing system, a price differential per cwt. and a per-head 
revenue differential exists over time, 2) the price differential per cwt. is subject to seasonal variation 
which contributes to inconsistent price signals transmitted to producers concerning the market value of 
carcass characteristics over time; 3) grid revenue per-head variability is consistently higher than dressed 
weight revenue per-head variability over time; and 4) while grid pricing has not been widely adopted by 
producers, overall carcass quality has trended higher in the region from which data was collected. 
The marketing implications for decision makers are: 1) the incentive to market on a grid versus 
selling fed cattle dressed weight is lower in the spring relative to the fall; 2) marketing on a grid does 
reward producers selling high quality steers and the incentive to market higher quality cattle on a grid has 
been increasing over the 206-week period of the study; 3) grid discounts levied on lower quality cattle 
have been increasing over time; 4) grid pricing results in higher per-head revenue variability relative to 
selling fed cattle dressed-weight, indicating that while producers do receive premiums for selling fed 
cattle on a grid, it is also a riskier marketing option relative to average pricing; and 5) the four-year trend 
in packer premiums and discounts for above-average and below-average quality cattle, respectively, have 
been increasing. This trend indicates that packers are providing a price incentive to producers to 
encourage improvement in overall cattle quality. 
I Scott W. Fausti and Bashir Qasmi are members of the Economic Department's faculty at South Dakota State 
University. All correspondence should be sent to Prof. Fausti: South Dakota State University, Economics 
Department, Scobey Hall, Box 504, Brookings, SD 57007-0895. 
DOES THE PRODUCER HA VE AN INCENTIVE 
TO SELL FED CATTLE ON A GRID? 
BACKGROUND 
The decline in beef's comparative advantage in the domestic meat market relative to other 
domestic meat products and foreign imports began in the mid 1970s.2 In 1990, the National Cattlemen's 
Beef Association (NCBA) released the Value Based Marketing Task Force final report. The task force 
recommended that the industry seriously consider developing and adopting a Value Based Marketing 
System (VBMS) for fed cattle to replace the traditional average pricing systems of live weight and 
dressed weight pricing by the pen. This VBMS strategy called for the development of a new cash 
marketing system (application of discounts and premiums beyond dressed weight and grade) that would 
encourage producers to raise leaner cattle that still would grade at least USDA low choice. The industry 
has responded to the recommendations of the taskforce by developing individual carcass pricing systems; 
commonly referred to as grid pricing systems. However, the published literature addressing the issues of 
price discovery in the slaughter cattle market and value-based marketing of slaughter cattle suggest that 
the widespread adoption of grid pricing as an alternative to average pricing (live or dressed weight) faces 
several hurdles: 1) Producers receive inconsistent price signals when they sell fed cattle on packer grid 
systems; and 2) grid pricing is a riskier marketing alternative than average pricing.3 
On the issue of inconsistent price signals, F euz ( 1999b) recently conducted a fed cattle 
marketing study on the relative economic efficiency of three grid pricing systems. Feuz presented 
evidence that those grid carcass quality price signals that were transmitted to producers varied: 1) across 
the three grids at specific points in time; and 2) over six different marketing dates within the individual 
price grids.4 Feuz concluded, "Present grid pricing practices are sending different price signals to 
producers across grids, and some signals may vary over time." 
The literature focusing on uncertainty over carcass quality in the market for slaughter cattle 
makes a strong case that varying degrees of incomplete information on carcass quality during the 
transaction process generate uncertainty over the quality of cattle marketed via the live and dressed 
weight alternatives (Ward 1987; Feuz et al. 1993; Fausti and Feuz 1995). This uncertainty, combined 
with risk averse behavior, creates price differentials and increases price variability between alternatives 
and sustains the demand by cattle producers for multiple pricing alternatives. Empirical evidence 
presented in the literature demonstrates that marketing fed cattle at an average price reduces per-head 
price variability relative to marketing fed cattle through a value based pricing system (Feuz et al. 1993; 
Feuz et al. 1995; Fausti et al. 1998). The literature concludes that selling fed cattle at an average price is 
preferred by risk averse producers over selling fed cattle on a value based marketing alternative. 
Empirical verification of the persistence of these "barriers to adoption" over time has not been 
documented in the literature. However, resistence to the widespread adoption of a VBMS by producers 
2 Purcell (1998) provides an excellent discussion on the economic causes and consequences associated with the 
decline in the demand for beef since 1975. 
3 See Fausti et al. (1998) for a review of this literature. 
4 Carcass quality characteristics included hot carcass weight, ribeye area, marbling, backfat thickness, etc. 
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throughout the 1990s has been documented.5 Greater understanding of these "barriers to adoption" is 
needed. The possible permanence of these barriers and their consequences for the future health of the 
beef industry need to be recognized by industry stakeholders. The implications for the cattle industry if 
average pricing of slaughter cattle continues to dominate the fed cattle market into the future are: 1) 
inconsistent beef quality and dissatisfied consumers, 2) failure to reduce excess fat production, which is 
costing the industry billions of dollars; and 3) continuing pressure on beefs market share of total US 
meat sales resulting from overall improvement in meat quality and reduced production costs in the pork 
and poultry industries. 
The intent of this study is to investigate if the "barriers to the adoption of grid pricing by fed 
cattle producers" alluded to in the literature are empirically verifiable over time. The general issues to be 
addressed are: l )  Does the marketing of slaughter cattle on a grid result in producers receiving 
inconsistent price signals over time, and 2) Over the four-year period of the study, has it been 
advantageous for producers to sell fed cattle on a grid relative to selling fed cattle at an average price. 
The incentive structure of a grid pricing system is the key to determining if the concern over "barriers to 
adoption" is justified. 
Grid premiums and discounts levied upon a carcass, based on an individual carcass's quality 
characteristics, constitute any particular grid's incentive mechanism. Our empirical study relies on AMS 
publicly reporting weekly grid premium and discount information supplied voluntarily by the packing 
industry. The overall goal is to empirically identify characteristics and trends in the incentive structure of 
grid pricing over time. The first objective of the empirical analysis is to determine if the findings 
reported in the literature (Feuz et al. 1993; Feuz et al. 1995; Fausti and Feuz 1995) are persistent over 
time: 1) the existence of a carcass price per cwt. differential between grid pricing and dressed weight 
pricing, and 2) higher per-head revenue variability associated with fed cattle sold on a grid relative to the 
dressed weight alternative. The second objective is to determine if the grid pricing incentive mechanism, 
i.e., carcass quality price signals (premiums and discounts), has been inconsistent over time (Feuz 
l 999b ). The third objective is to identify marketing implications for fed cattle producers who are 
considering selling their fed cattle on a grid. 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
Data Description 
The empirical approach adopted for this study is an extension of that developed by Fausti et al. 
( 1998). Two data sets containing carcass information on 1500 slaughter steers used in the Fausti et al. 
study are evaluated on a grid and on an average pricing system over time. Carcass quality premium and 
discount information collected from weekly grid price reports published by the USDA's Agricultural 
Marketing News Service (AMS) over a four-year period (Jan 1997 to Dec. 2000) is used in the study. 
The analysis is based on weekly market data collected over a 206-week period combined with 
carcass data on a set of 2590 South Dakota slaughter steers. Weekly market data were collected from 
USDA-AMS reports. The carcass data were collected by the Animal and Range Science Department at 
South Dakota State University. 
5 Ward et al. (l 999) estimates that, at most, 20% of slaughter steers and heifers are marketed on a grid pricing 
system. 
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The Animal and Range Science Department at South Dakota State University (SDSU) conducted 
a Retained Ownership Demonstration Program (RODP) for steer calves during the first half of the 1990s 
(Wagner et al. 1991-95). During this period 2590 steer calves were entered into the program by 250 beef 
producers and raised to slaughter weight. Two data sets of 1500 randomly selected carcasses were 
constructed from the set of 2590 carcasses. The data selection procedure allowed for the possibility that a 
particular carcass could be included in both data sets. One set was designed to be 67% choice and 33% 
select (above-average data set). The other was 33% choice and 67% select (below-average data set). 
The grid pricing system utilized here is three-dimensional (yield grade, quality grade, and 
dressed carcass weight) and was designed by the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) division of the 
USDA for the purpose of price reporting.6 For each individual steer carcass, a grid carcass price was 
determined weekly by applying the reported premiums and discounts according to the carcass's yield 
grade, quality grade, and weight classification and then adding the individual carcass's premium or 
discount to the AMS grid's base price. See Fausti et al. ( 1998) for a detailed discussion of the AMS grid 
price reporting system. The result of this approach is that for each of the 1500 steers a grid price per 
cwt. and grid price per-head are calculated for each week and then the weekly average and standard 
deviation of these price variables for each pen are recorded and used to construct the above and below 
average quality data sets. 
Next, for each individual steer, a dressed weight price per-head is calculated and collected.7 The 
next step was to derive the weekly price differential for each carcass (grid price per cwt. minus HCWP 
per cwt.). The average weekly price differentials for the above-average and below-average data sets were 
then derived. An important feature of this approach is: cattle quality characteristics are held constant 
over time. Thus changes in the price differential are due solely to weekly changes in the AMS grid's 
base price, and the reported premiums and discounts. 
AMS Grid Price Structure: A Brief Overview 
The AMS grid is an additive grid; that is, the grid price per cwt. of a particular carcass is 
determined by the base price plus any carcass premiums and minus any carcass discounts. Grid price per 
cwt. is defined as, 
1) GRID PRICE= BASE PRICE+ PREMIUMS - DISCOUNTS. 
The base price varies from firm to firm, and can change from week to week. Following the work 
of Fausti et al. ( 1998) and Feuz ( l  999a), the base price for the AMS grid is assumed to be a function of 
6 The report's price data are collected by the AMS through a survey of six regional packer grid pricing strategies 
for the previous week. The premiums and discounts reported by the AMS represent an average of those packer 
reported discounts and premiums. The AMS first began to report grid premiums and discounts in October, 1996. 
7 The HCWP is the reported five-area (Texas/Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, Iowa/So. Minn) weekly 
weighted average price for dressed weight sales of slaughter steers grading 35% to 65% choice (USDA Livestock, 
Meat and Wool Weekly Summary and Statistics). A steer's dressed price per-head is the HCWP multiplied by hot 
carcass weight. The result of this approach is that for each of the I 500 steers, a dressed weight price per cwt. and 
dressed weight price per-head are calculated for each week and then the weekly mean and standard deviation of 
these price variables for each pen is recorded and used in the empirical analysis. 
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the regional reported HCWP and the "Choice-Select Price Spread Effect" as discussed in Ward et al. 
(1999): 
2) BASE PRICE = HCWP + (SELECTDISCOUNT ) * (1 - %CHOICE ).8 
There are well over 25 fed cattle price grids being used by the beef packing industry (Feuz 1998). 
Base price formulas vary across grids. Many grids tie the base price to a market quote, such as East 
Nebraska direct, West Kansas top, etc. The goal of the packer when establishing the weekly base price 
for its grid is to discover the market value of a choice, yield grade 3 carcass that weighs between 550 and 
950 pounds. On any given week the grid base price will vary from packer to packer.9 Over time, 
however, it is reasonable to postulate that there is a very strong positive correlation among packer weekly 
base prices. Accordingly, the computed base price used in this study should be a reasonable proxy for 
the base price of a typical packer over the period covered in this study. Figure 1 shows a plot of the 
regional grading percentage and the select discount over time. The HCWP and the computed base price 
are shown in figure 2. Figures 1&2 confirm that the calculated base price is consistent with market 
conditions. 
The price differential (PDIFF) for any particular carcass is defined as the grid price per cwt. 
minus the HCWP per cwt.: 
3) PDIFF = GRID PRICE - HCWP. 
Substituting equations 1&2 into equation 3, it is clear that the HCWP plays no direct role in 
determining the price differential:0 The price differential for any individual animal is solely a function 
of the choice/select spread effect and the grid's quality grade, yield grade, and weight premiums and 
discounts associated with the animal's carcass characteristics: 
4) PDIFF =SELECT-DISCOUNT* (l-%CHOICE) + PREMIUMS - DISCOUNTS. 11 
8 The regional grading percentage reflects the weekly proportion of slaughter steers grading choice in AMS 
reporting region 7&8 (IA, KS, MO, NE, CO, MT, ND, SD, UT, and WY). One minus the regional grading 
percentage provides an estimate for the proportion grading select. Multiplying the regional percentage grading 
select by the choice/select spread and adding the product to the regional HCWP provides an estimate of the HCWP 
for slaughter steers grading I 00% choice. Fausti et al. (1998) and Ward et al. (1999) use this approach to establish 
a base price in their analysis of grid pricing. At least one major packer uses the regional grading percentage when 
setting its weekly grid base price. 
9 Base price, premium and discount formulas are considered to be confidential by packing firms. 
10 However, a change in the HCWP does reflect a change in the equilibrium price for slaughter steers. There are 
two plausible hypotheses on how a change in equilibrium price will affect premium and discount levels: 1) Packers 
will raise and lower premium and discount levels proportional to changes in HCWP; and 2) An increase in the 
equilibrium price implies slaughter steers have become relatively more scarce. In tum, packers will have to increase 
quality grade and yield grade premiums and reduce discounts across all categories to maintain purchase levels. Both 
hypotheses suggest that the HCWP has an indirect effect on PDIF. 
11 The select-discount also represents the premium paid for choice carcasses relative to select carcasses. In eqs. 2 
and 4, the select-discount is entered into the calculations as a positive value. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Objective I: Analysis of the Price Differential and Revenue Variability over Time. 
Table I provides pen level summary statistics for the weekly average price differential per cwt. 
for the above and below average carcass quality data sets over a 206-week period. The summary statistics 
indicate, as expected, that the above-average (below-average) quality data set had a higher (lower) 
average price per cwt. when evaluated via the AMS grid. 
TABLE I. Mean, standard deviation, and the 206-week range of the weekly average price 
differential per c""1. (PDIFF). 
Price Difference Mean SD Min Max 
Above-Average Pen 1.147 0.589 0.01 2.40 
Below-Average Pen -1.316 0.570 -2.81 -0.48 
The mean value for the above-average pen and below-average pen price differentials reported in 
Table I reflect the average ( over 206 weeks) weekly premium or discount per cwt. (respectively) 
associated with selling fed cattle on the AMS grid relative to selling on a hot carcass weight (HCW) 
basis. 12 The results reported in table I can be interpreted in the following manner: I) If the steers in the 
above-average pen were sold at an average price, then the producer's implicit discount would be a minus 
$ 1.14 7 per cwt.; and 2) If the steers in the below-average pen were sold at an average price, then the 
producer's implicit premium would be a positive $ 1.316 per cwt. The ranges of the two price 
differentials indicate that the implicit discounts and premiums associated with average pricing are erratic 
but persistent over time. 
The issue of implicit discounts and premiums arising when slaughter cattle are sold by the pen at 
an average price is at the center of the push for the development of a value based marketing system for 
slaughter cattle. Grid pricing eliminates implicit premiums and discounts which distort the information 
contained in transaction prices when fed cattle are sold by the pen at an average price. Grid pricing 
improves market efficiency by reducing uncertainty over carcass quality traits during the transaction 
(Value Based Marketing Taskforce 1990; Feuz et al. 1993; Fausti et al. 1998; Schroeder and Graff 2000). 
The persistence of positive premiums (over time) reported in Table I for the above-average pen indicates 
that packers are rewarding producers who can supply high quality cattle to the market and sell on a grid. 
However, the range in the premium for the above-average pen of I cent to $2.40 per cwt. indicates 
substantial fluctuations in the incentive to market higher quality cattle on a grid. The risk associated with 
grid price incentive variability is the next issue to be addressed. 
12 A simple hypothesis test indicated that the mean price differential was non-zero at a level of significance of 
Jess than I% for both the above and below quality data sets. 
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To accomplish the second part of objective one, we examine per-head mean revenue and the 
standard deviation of per-head revenue across pens over the 206-week period. 13 Table II provides pen 
level first moment statistics (averages) for the distribution of per-head revenues and the distribution of 
the weekly standard deviation of per-head revenues for the above and below-average pens over a 206-
week period for both the AMS grid and dressed weight marketing alternatives. 14 
TABLE II. Mean values for the weekly per-head pen revenue and the weekly standard deviation of 
per-head revenue for the above and below average pens. 15 
First Moment Statistics 
Above-Average Pen 
GRID REV 
DRWT REV 
Below-Average Pen 
Grid REV 
DRWTREV 
206-Week Pen 
Average for 
per-head revenue 
$760.45 
$752.19 
$741.92 
$751.36 
206-Week Pen Average 
for the weekly per-head 
revenue standard deviation 
$86.38 
$77.20 
$84.43 
$78.01 
The four-year average for the standard deviation of per-head revenue is significantly higher for 
the AMS grid relative to the dressed weight pricing alternative for both the above and below average 
pens.16 The implication is that, on average, per-head revenue variability has been higher when cattle are 
u In the below-average quality pen, the mean and standard deviation for hot carcass weight is 718.56 pounds 
and 74.16 pounds respectively. In the above-average quality pen, the mean and standard deviation for hot carcass 
weight is 719.37 pounds and 73.83 pounds respectively. 
14 The weekly per-head grid revenue and per-head dressed weight revenue standard deviation for the above and 
below-average pens was calculated and collected over the 206 week period. The weekly revenue standard 
deviations were then summed and the mean values are those reported in Table II. The reported means of the 
standard deviations reflect both the average variability in the pen level hot carcass weight per-head and the average 
variability in price, whether it is a grid or dressed weight price. However, hot carcass weight variability in the t\vo 
data sets is constant over time because carcass characteristics are being held constant over time. 
15 The statistics provided in Table II indicate that at the pen level, per-head revenue differentials have been 
persistent over time. The AMS grid paid, on average over four years, a per-head premium of $8.26 for cattle in the 
above-average pen relative to what those cattle would have received if they were sold dressed weight. The AMS 
grid levied a discount of $9.44 per-head on cattle in the below-average pen relative to what those cattle would have 
received if they were sold dressed weight. These results are consistent with the price differential results reported in 
Table I and the findings reported in the literature. 
16 Test for the difference between population means (large sample) for both the above and below-average pens 
indicate that the mean revenue per-head standard deviations are statistically different with p-values of less than I%. 
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sold through a grid relative to selling fed cattle dressed weight, regardless of overall pen carcass qual ity . 1 7  
Assuming that revenue variabi lity is a reasonable indicator of riskiness, grid pricing has consistently been 
the riskier marketing alternative relative dressed weight pric ing. The effect of increased revenue 
variabil ity on producers marketing decisions requires further study. 
Objective II: Empirical Analysis of How Consistent the Grid Incentive Mechanism is Over 
Time. 
The price differential per cwt.(grid minus dressed weight) for a pen of cattle reflects the 
producer's incentive or disincentive to market cattle on a grid. Given that cattle qual ity characteristics are 
held constant over time in this  study, changes in the price d ifferential reflect changes in the market signal 
to producers, which indicates that the incentive structure of a packer's grid has changed . F euz ( 1 999b) 
raises the issue of inconsistent price signals over time and this is the issue to be investigated next. To 
provide insight on this question, an autoregressive model is employed. The data reveal a seasonality 
component in the time series that is the result of a seasonal fluctuation in the proportion of choice cattle 
being slaughtered (regional grading percentage) in region 7&8 (figure I). Seasonal variabi lity in the 
regional grading percentage results in seasonal variabi lity in the choice/select spread, which in turn 
introduces a seasonal component into the price differential. To handle this econometric issue a two-stage 
recursive autoregressive model is adopted. 
The empirical analysis uti lizes a two-step recursive OLS estimation procedure ( corrected for 
serial correlation) as described i n  Johnston ( 1 972, pp.376-80) and Kennedy ( 1 984, p. 1 1 8) .  In the first 
stage, seasonal monthly dummy variables and a time-trend variable are regressed on %CHOICE. 1 8  
Predicted values from the first stage analysis, along with a weekly time-trend variable and weekly hot 
carcass weight price, are regressed on the price differential PDIFF. 19 
FIRST STAGE: 
5) %CHOICEt = a +b1TimeTrend + b2Jan + b3Feb + b4Mar + b5Apr + b6May + 
b7June + b8July + b9Aug + b10Sept + b 1 10ct + b 1 1Nov + Vr 
SECOND STAGE: 
6) PDIFF, = a +  /J 1TimeTrend + /J2Choice + jJJHCWPt + E t. 
The time-trend variable in the first-stage equation is incl uded to detect any change in the weekly 
proportion of choice cattle being slaughtered over time. The time-trend variable in the second-stage 
equation is for detecting any change in the weekly price differential not due to changes in the weekly 
qual ity composition of cattle being slaughtered over time. The hot carcass weight price is included in the 
17 For both the above and below -average pens, the weekly revenue per-head standard deviation is higher for the 
AMS grid than for dressed weight pricing. Analysis indicates that the range for the difference of the weekly 
standard deviation of per-head revenue (grid minus dressed weight) is positive for both the above and below­
average pens over the entire 206-week period. 
18 December was selected as the reference month. 
19 The recursive modeling assumption is that the price differential is a function of the regional grading 
percentage, but the reverse is not true. The bar symbol {-) denotes the predicted value of the independent variable. 
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second stage regressions to determine if there is any evidence of packers adjusting grid premiums and 
discounts to changes in the general market price of fed cattle. The Yule-Walker correction procedure 
was used to estimate the first and second stage autoregressive models.20 The results for the first-stage 
equation are reported in Table III. The results for the above-average data set are reported in Table IV and 
the results for the below-average data set are reported in Table V .  
Table III: Yule-Walker Estimates (First-Stage) . 
Dependent Variable:%CHOICE 
I 
Durbin-Watson D = 2.13 SSE =391.6 
TOT RSQ = 0.813 MSE= 2.05 
Number of Obs. 206 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Param = O  Prob > I T I 
INTERCEPT 1 48 .674 1 .290 37 .71 0.00 1  
TIME-TREND 1 0 .017 0 .009 1 . 88 0 .06 1  
JAN 1 2 .343 0 .627 3 . 73 0 .001 
FEB 1 3 . 1 79 0.774 4 . 10 0 .001  
MAR 1 3 . 674 0.858 4 .28 0 .00 1  
APR 1 1 . 835 0 .909 2.02 0 .045 
MAY 1 0 .588 0 .933 0 .63 0 .529 
JUNE 1 0 .665 0.938 0 .7 1  0 .478 
JULY 1 0 .070 0 .924 0.08 0.934 
AUG 1 - 1 .07 0 .889 - 1 .20 0 .230 
SEPT - 1 . 899 0 .828 -2.29 0.029 
OCT 1 -2.095 0.726 -2.88 0 .00 1  
NOV 1 -0.538 0 .554 -0.97 0 . 337 
AR(l) 1 -0.468 0 .058 -7. 96 0 .00 1  
AR(4) 1 -0. 377 0 .058 -6.41 0 .001 
The coefficients for the January thru April variables are positive and significant, i ndicating that 
there are a h igher proportion of fed cattle being slaughtered, which grade at least choice and l ess than 
yield grade four. The coefficients for the September and October variables are negative and significant. 
The regression results generated by the first stage equation (Table III) are consistent with the l ife cycle 
production pattern of the fed cattle industry in region 7&8. A preponderance of the calving in region 7&8 
occurs in the early spring, resulting in a seasonal pattern of higher qual ity grade cattle coming to market 
the fol lowing spring, relative to the qual ity of slaughter cattle marketed in the fal l .  An interesting trend 
developing over the four-year period of this study was that the proportion of fed steers slaughtered 
grading at least choice/ y ield grade 3 increased i n  region 7&8, as indicated by the positive and 
significant coefficient for the time-trend variable .  
20 The error terms V and E are assumed to be generated by an autoregressive process: For example 
V, et - a, v,. 1 -. . .  -aP v,_p, where e, is a sequence of independent normally distributed error terms. The autoregressive 
parameter estimates were generated using the Yule-Walker stepwise estimation procedure (SAS/ETS, 1 990). 
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Table IV: Yule-Walker Estimates (below-average data set) . 
Dependent Variable: PDIFF
1 
Durbin-Watson D =2.107 
TOT RSQ = 0.8862 
For Number of Obs.= 206 
Parameter Standard 
Variable DF Estimate Error 
INTERCEPT -2.3 52 l .007 
TIME-TREND -0.004 0.002 
%Choice
t 0.038 0 .0 1 2  
HCWP
1 
-0.004 0.007 
AR(]) -0.906 0.029 
SSE=7.58 
MSE=0.03 
T for HO: 
Param=O Prob > ITI 
-2 .33  0.020 
- l .90 0.058 
3 .05 0.002 
-0.63 0.525 
-30.48 0 .00 1 
The regression resu lts in Table IV provide statistical evidence to support the fol lowing 
conclusions: I )  Removing the effects of seasonal ity and time, the below-average carcass qual ity data set 
received a discount of $2.35 cwt. when evaluated using the AMS grid relative to dressed weight; 2) Th is 
discount was lower (6 to 14 cents per cwt.) during the months of January through April, and higher (6 to 
7 cents per cwt.) during the September and October;2 1  3) The time-trend variable's coefficient is 
significant and negative, indicating that the discount per cwt. levied on the below-average pen increased 
by an estimated -69 cents per cwt. over the four-year period.22 As an example, in week I of the study, 
the model estimates the average discount per cwt. at $2.35, and at week 206 the discount increases to 
$3 .04 per cwt.; and 4) Changes in the general price level offed steers (HCWP) did not contribute to 
explaining the variabil ity in the price differential for the below-average pen. 
21  The seasonality price effect is calculated by multiplying the first-stage coefficient estimate for a particular 
month by the second stage estimated coefficient for %Choice. This procedure allowed an estimate for each month's 
price effect to be calculated. 
22 The time trend variable has a direct and indirect effect on the dependent variable: 2PDIFF/2 Time-trend 
+2PDIFF/2%Choice * 2%Choice/2Time-trend. The direct effect at 206 weeks is 82 cents and the indirect effect is 
13cents, therefore the discount (in absolute terms) increased by 69 cents over the 206-week period. 
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Table V: Yule-Walker Estimates (above-average data set). 
Dependent Variable: PDIFF
1 
Durbin-Watson D =1.53 
TOT RSQ = 0.8997 
For Number of Obs.= 206 
SSE=7.13 
MSE=0.035 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Param=O 
INTERCEPT 2.436 0.866 2.8 1  
TIME-TREND 0.00 17  0.0009 1 .84 
%Choice
1 
-0.050 0.0 1 1 -4.41  
HCWP
I 
0.0 1 0  0.006 1 .67 
AR(l )  -0.771 0.044 - 17. 1 8  
Prob > ITI 
0.005 
0.066 
0.00 1 
0.095 
0.00 1 
The regression results in the Table V provide statistical evidence to support the following 
conclusions: l )  Removing the effects of seasonality and time, the above-average carcass quality data set 
received a premium of $2.436 cwt. when evaluated using the AMS grid relative to dressed weight; 2) 
This premium was lower ( 1 0  to 1 8  cents per cwt.) during the months of January through April, and 
higher (9 to 10 cents per cwt.) during the September and October; 3) the time-trend variable's coefficient 
is significant and positive, indicating that the premium per cwt. paid for cattle in the above-average pen 
increased by 35 cents per cwt. over the four-year period.23 As an example, in week 1 of the study, the 
model estimates the average premium per cwt. at $2.436, and at week 206 the premium increases to $2.61  
per cwt. and 4) Changes in the general price level of fed steers (HCWP) did contribute a small amount 
of information to help explain the variability in the price differential for the above-average pen. A one 
dollar increase in the HCWP per cwt. increased the price differential premium for the above-average pen 
by 1 cent per cwt. There is only marginal evidence to be found in the regression results to support either 
of the proposed hypotheses (footnote 1 0) on how changes in the HCWP affect packer determined grid 
premiums and discounts. This result suggests that additional research is needed on how packers set and 
change grid premium and discount values. 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DECISION MAKERS IN THE SLAUGHTER 
CATTLE MARKET 
The simple response to the question implied in the title of this paper is yes. For the above­
average quality data set the monetary incentive has been positive and increasing over the last four years. 
However, for producers expecting consistent premium levels superior to selling cattle at an average price, 
and for those producers marketing cattle not meet ing minimum qual ity standards in order to earn grid 
premiums, or for those producers who are risk averse, the empirical evidence indicates that these types of 
23 However, the time trend variable has a direct and indirect effect on the dependent variable: 
BPDIFF/8 Timetrend +aPDIFF/B%Choice * B%Choice/BTime-trend. The direct effect at 206 weeks is 35cents and 
the indirect effect is (- 17.5 cents), therefore the net premium per cwt. increased by 17.5 cents over the 206-week 
period. 
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producers will be: I )  disappointed if they market on a grid, or 2) decide to only sell their cattle dressed or 
live weight. We conclude that the "barriers to the widespread adoption" of grid pricing do exist and have 
been persistent over the time period covered by this study. 
The value based marketing literature suggests the incentive mechanism of a value based pricing 
system, like grid pricing, should reward producers for producing superior quality cattle. The positive 
time-trend variable for the above-average quality pen and the negative time-trend variable for the below­
average quality pen suggests that the incentive structure of the grid system has been increasing both 
premiums for above-average cattle and discounts levied on below-average cattle. It seems that packers 
are sending consistent signals concerning the type of cattle they are willing to pay a premium for. 
Defining consistency as: The range of the price differential being positive for the above-average pen over 
the entire four-year period covered by the study. 
The empirical results suggest that packers are sending even stronger signals concerning the 
consequences to producers delivering cattle that fail to meet the mini um carcass quality standards desired 
by the packer. A producer who has consistently delivered below-average quality cattle to a packer and 
sold them on a grid has experienced increasing penalties. The implication is that implicit premiums have 
been increasing for below-average cattle being sold at an average price. The consequence for the industry 
is that the market distorting effect of average pricing has become an even more pressing problem. With a 
majority of slaughter cattle still being sold at an average price, there will not be a dramatic improvement 
in the overall quality of beef produced or a large reduction in excess fat production because, at an 
average price, fat receives the same price as lean. 
However, the four-year trend in packer premiums and discounts for above-average and below­
average quality cattle, respectively, have been increasing. This trend indicates that packers are providing 
a price incentive to producers to encourage improvement in overall cattle quality. There is empirical 
evidence that the quality of cattle being slaughtered in region 7&8 has improved over the last four years . 
To what extent grid pricing has influenced the improvement in regional carcass quality is a topic of 
future research. 
The price differential associated with selling on a grid relative to selling at an average price 
exhibits a strong seasonal pattern (figure III). The price differential narrows for both the above-average 
and below-average pens during the spring. This infers a lower incentive to market on a grid as the price 
differential narrows relative to selling cattle dressed weight. In the fall months, the price differential 
widens for both the above-average and below-average pens. In the fall, the grid premium paid for above­
average cattle increases and the grid discount levied on below-average cattle deepens. This infers a 
greater incentive to market fed cattle on a grid as the price differential widens. The marketing 
implications for producers are: I) grid incentives are influenced by seasonal market conditions and 
producers should incorporate that information into their marketing decisions; and 2) if a producer is 
uncertainty about carcass quality, then the potential revenue loss (poor carcass quality) from selling on 
grid versus selling at an average price is less in the spring relative to selling in the fall. These results are 
consistent with the seasonal pattern in the choice-select spread and the results reported by Feuz ( I 999b) 
that grid price signals are not consistent over time. 
The results of the study also support the conclusions arrived at in the earlier literature on the 
existence of price differentials Fausti and Feuz ( 1 995). The empirical evidence presented indicates that 
the price differentials are persistent over time and highly variable, lending further support for the time 
inconsistency conjecture proposed by Feuz (l 999b ). The data provides evidence that selling cattle on a 
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grid relative to selling cattle at an average price does result in higher per-head revenue variability. This 
result is also shown to be persistent over time. The implication is that marketing fed cattle on a grid has 
consistently been a riskier marketing option for the producer relative to selling at an average price during 
the period covered in this study. The question that needs further investigation is if the premiums 
associated with grid pricing offsets the additional price risk. 
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